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It has been argued and empirically documented that with a looming financial 
crisis, the risk-reward trade-off of market participant changes, resulting in a decrease in 
market sentiment.  Traders flock towards less risky securities which drives the returns of 
such securities higher.  In this paper, based on a methodology developed by Persaud 
[1996], by correlating the riskiness and returns of securities in various international 
equity markets, an index to measure the sentiment of market participants is constructed.  
We use the breaking point of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as the onset of the 
financial crisis in 2008. 
We track the market sentiment that we construct in months leading to the 
bankruptcy.  We find that while market sentiment was high at the beginning of the year it 
started declining drastically many months prior to the bankruptcy, indicating that market 
participants were behaving as if a financial crises was approaching.  Market sentiment 
remains low in a few months after the crisis, shows some improvement thereafter in 
anticipation of policies to address the crisis, but still remains depressed as compared to 
pre-crisis levels as policy makers struggle to formulate regulatory changes. 
The findings in this paper are consistent with an emerging strand of finance 
literature [see, e.g., Bezemer, 2009] which disputes the notion that the financial crisis 
could not be foreseen.  Market participants were convinced of the impending crisis and 
were behaving in a manner consistent with that, even when policy makers and senior 
executives the financial services seemed oblivious. 
 






, 2008 Hank Paulson, the then United States Secretary of the 
Treasury, declared, “I have great, great confidence in our capital markets and in our 
financial institutions.  Our financial institutions, banks and investment banks, are strong.  
Our capital markets are resilient.  They’re efficient.  They’re flexible.”  Mr. Paulson was 
not alone in his optimism - Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, speaking at 
a Federal Reserve conference on June 9
th
 2008 said, “Despite a recent spike in the 
nation’s unemployment rate, the danger that the economy has fallen into a “substantial 
downturn” appears to have waned.”  Of course, events later during the year turned out to 
be not consistent with the sanguine outlook leaving many observers to question why 
policy makers and industry experts did not foresee the approaching financial and 
economic crisis.  In their defense leading figures of the industry like Lloyd Blankfein, 
Chief Executive Officer of Goldman Sachs, stated during a Congressional hearing, “After 
the fact, it is easy to be convinced that the signs were visible and compelling” and former 
US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin said, “few, if any people anticipated the sort of 
meltdown that we are seeing in the credit markets at present… I do not know anyone who 
predicted this course of events.”  The former Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan 
Greenspan, may have provided vindication for all when he wrote, “Much as we might 
wish otherwise, policy makers cannot reliably anticipate financial or economic shocks or 
the consequences of economic imbalances.  Financial crisis are characterized by 
discontinuous breaks in market pricing the timing of which by definition must be 
unanticipated.”   
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While arguments for the “no one saw this coming” point of view abound there is 
also now a fast emerging body of work that suggests that signs of crisis were present; 
e.g.,
1
 Baker [2005] and Baker DeLong and Krugman [2006] saw declining housing prices 
and economic slowdown in the horizon.  In 2007, Godley forecast a drop in borrowing 
and private expenditure in the coming quarters, with severe consequences for growth and 
unemployment.  Indeed, as Kakutani [2010] points out, the crisis may not have been 
foreseen by chief executives of America’s premier banks, regulators, and Treasury 
officials or by the Federal Reserve but was anticipated by investors who used their 
insights to profit from the shattering breakdown of the financial system. 
 In this paper, we provide empirical evidence to show that the onset of the 
financial crisis was anticipated by equity market participants.  Based on a methodology 
developed by Persaud [1996] in the context of currency markets and later used by 
Bandopadhyaya and Jones [2006] in a single equity market, we construct an index which 
measures the sentiment of investors across worldwide equity markets – we call this the 
World Equity Market Sentiment Index [WEMSI].  High positive values of the WEMSI 
indicate risk seeking behavior among equity investors while and low negative values of 
the index suggest risk averse behavior.  Risk-averse behavior is more typical during a 
crisis period, when market participants feel less compensated for the amount of risk that 
is present in equities [this is explained in greater detail in the main body of the paper].  
We track the WEMSI from December 2007 to June 2009 and use the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy in September 2008, which according to many researchers [see e.g., Aragon 
and Strahan, 2009] is considered to be the formal onset of the financial crisis, as breaking 
                                                 
1
 See Bezemer [2009) for a more complete description. 
Page 5 of 19 –Financial Crises and Investor Sentiment - Bandopadhyaya and Truong 
 
 
point in our analysis.  We define pre-crisis, crisis and post crisis phases and examine the 
behavior of the WEMSI in each of these sub-time periods.  Results indicate that while the 
market sentiment as measured by WEMSI was high during the early part of 2008, it had 
started to decline and attain negative values many months prior to the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy.  The behavior of market participants in months leading up to the Lehman 
bankruptcy was just as would be anticipated during a financial crisis.  Negative values of 
the index persist in months after the bankruptcy filing, briefly moves in to a positive 
range, perhaps because of optimism due to the Troubled Asset Relief Program, but then 
dips in to the negative region as the economy falters and the mood in financial markets 
becomes less sanguine. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I discusses market 
sentiment in general and describes the construction of the WEMSI.  Section II presents 
the empirical findings and its implications.  Section III concludes. 
 
I. Market Sentiment: The World Equity Market Sentiment Index 
 Market sentiment influences investor judgment and behavior, and thus become an 
extra source of risk [Canbas and Kandir, 2009].  Studies have recognized that investor 
sentiment may be an important component of the market pricing process [see Fisher and 
Statman [2000] and Baker and Wurgler [2006]].  Market sentiment has been used to 
explain financial contagion in the equity and currency markets that occur independently 
of economic fundamentals [e.g., Eichengreen and Mody [1998]].  Some authors advocate 
that market sentiment may explain short-term movements in asset prices better than any 
other set of fundamental factors [see, e.g., Baek, Bandopadhyaya and Du [2005]]. 
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 Many investor sentiment measures have been identified in the academic literature 
and in the popular press.  Dennis and Mayhew [2002] have used the Put-Call Ratio, 
Randall, Suk and Tully [2003] utilize Net Cash Flow into Mutual Funds, Lashgari [2000] 
uses the Barron’s Confidence Index, Baker and Wurgler [2006] use the Issuance 
Percentage, Whaley [2000] uses the VIX-Investor Fear Gauge.  Kumar and Persaud 
[2002] construct an index called the Risk Appetite Index [RAI].  They convincingly argue 
that measures other than the RAI could be measuring changes in the underlying risk of the 
market itself just as easily as they could be measuring changes in investor attitude 
towards that risk; it is not possible to isolate the two phenomena.  The advantage of the 
RAI is that changes to the underlying riskiness of the market do not directly affect the 
proposed measure and thus it more accurately reflects the changes in the market’s attitude 
towards risk. 
Kumar and Persaud [2002] suggest that investors are at any point in time in one of 
two states: risk loving or risk averse.  These investors may become more risk loving or 
risk averse even though the underlying risk in a particular financial security has not 
changed.  If the market's appetite for risk were fixed, changes in assets prices would be 
driven only by unanticipated shifts in economic risk.  If the appetite for risk grows and 
economic risks are unchanged, investors will feel overcompensated for these risk levels 
and the sense of overcompensation will grow as the level of risk grows.  As investors 
take advantage of what they see as an improving risk-return trade off, asset values will 
change in line with their risk.  High-risk assets should increase in value more than low-
risk ones and the riskiest asset should rally the most.  The reverse argument applies when 
the risk appetite falls.  Values of high-risk assets would decrease more than those 
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perceived to be safe.  Thus, a risk appetite index could be constructed based upon the 




This risk appetite contributes to contagion when negative news in one market 
brings upon reaction in other markets.  A crisis event in one country may cause investors 
to revise their overall risk appetite and to reassess the situation in the entire region.  This 
will lead to further drops in asset values and generate further crisis [Kumar and Persaud, 
2002].  Investigating the effects of investor sentiment during crisis periods, Gai and 
Vause [2006] stated that the reduction in risk appetite during the Asian financial crisis 
was the underlying reason for contagion and financial instability. 
In order to investigate how the appetite for risk and the market sentiment of 
investors behaved prior to and during the financial crisis of 2008, we adapt the notion of 
the RAI in Kumar and Persaud [2002] to develop the WEMSI.  We select nine global 
market indices to represent the world equity markets.  These indices are the Tokyo Price 
Index, Hang Seng Index, Standard and Poor’s 500 Index, Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Index, the Deutscher Aktienindex, FTSE 100, BOVESPA, SENSEX, and the CAC 40 
representing the markets of Japan, Hong Kong, United States, China, Germany, London, 
South America, India, and France respectively.  For each month between December 2007 
and June 2009, we find the monthly rate of return of each index and the moving average 
of the standard deviation (historic volatility, which is a measure of the riskiness of the 
                                                 
2
 Persaud discusses the risk appetite in a research report published by JP Morgan Securities Ltd.  This idea 
has received attention in the “Economics Focus” series in the Economist [1996), and in a 1998 conference 
on business cycles organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.   Other studies [e.g., Baek, 
Bandopadhyaya and Du [2005)] and Bandopadhyaya and Jones (2006) have used Persaud’s notion of risk 
appetite to construct risk appetite indices applicable to different contexts.  
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market represented by the index) of the index return in the five previous months.  To 
construct the WEMSI we find the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the rank 
of the monthly return and the rank of the historic volatility of the return of each index, 
multiplied by 100.  Specifically: 
  
  WEMSI = 





ir r iv v
ir r iv v
R R R R






  ;     -100 WEMSI+100 (1) 
 
 
where Rir and Riv are the rank of return and volatility for index i, respectively, and rR  
and vR are the mean of the ranks Rr and Rv, respectively.  The WEMSI accurately depicts 
the attitudes of equity traders because as traders shift their investments from low to high 
risk securities in accordance with their risk appetite, those riskier securities will increase 
in value.  Conversely, if traders prefer low risk securities because of a decline in their risk 
appetite, less risky will increase in value.  Thus, the strength of correlation between the 
rank of index return and the index risk would measure the market sentiment.   
 
II. Empirical Findings and Implications 
We use the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008 to identify the formal 
onset of the crisis and define the three month period before and three month period after 
(June 2008 to December 2008) as the crisis period.  The six months prior to our crisis 
period (December 2007 to May 2008) is the pre-crisis period and the six months after the 
crisis period (January 2009 to June 2009) is the post-crisis periods.  Figure 1 summarizes 
the sample period and its division in to three parts. 
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Table 1 shows returns of each market index during the sample period.  Average 
returns in all markets, with one exception, are negative in the pre-crisis period.  During 
the crisis, all markets demonstrate negative average returns, and are in general more 
negative as compared to the pre-crisis period.  In the post crisis period some markets 
show signs of recovery, posting positive average returns, while in other markets average 
returns remain in the negative region.  Not unexpectedly, average returns show a greater 
variance during the crisis as compared to the pre-crisis period, which captures the 
increase in market volatility during a crisis.  Market volatility remains high during the 
post-crisis period – even though markets begin to show some signs of recovery 
uncertainty contributes to large standard deviations in market returns. 
 Table 2 shows the correlation of returns between the indices used in the study for 
the pre-crisis, crisis, and post crisis period.  During the pre-crisis period there is a wide 
range of correlation between the various indices with values ranging from 0.2 to values 
closer to 1.  In the crisis period, most correlation values increased and values that were 
lower during the pre-crisis period now show a uniformly greater positive correlation.  
This is consistent with earlier research on asset market contagion which has documented 
that there is an increase in the correlations of asset prices during crises periods.  For 
example, Baig and Goldfajn (1998) find that there is an increase in the yield spreads of 
sovereign bonds during periods of crises as compared to tranquil periods.  Fleming, Kirby 
and Ostdiek (1998) examine and find strong volatility linkages between stock, bond and 
money markets, and they find an increase in the linkages after currency crises.  In the 
post crisis period, correlation values increased even further suggesting that markets may 
not yet be out of a crisis and contagion has not yet subsided. 
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 Table 3 reports the WEMSI values during the three sub periods.  Index values 
range from -0.56667 to 0.683333 with a mean of 0.027778 during the pre-crisis period.  
Crisis period index values are all negative ranging from -0.13333 to -0.86667 with a 
mean of -0.49079.  Post crisis index values are generally positive ranging from -0.46667 
to 0.566667 with a mean of 0.086111.  Figures 2, 3 and 4 track the WEMSI for each 
month during the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods, respectively.  Starting in 
December 2007, the index value is high capturing the risk-seeking behavior of equity 
market participants at that time.  However, by March 2008 WEMSI dropped in to the 
negative range, remained low in April 2008 and is negative again the following month.  
Market participants seem to have lowered their appetite for risk, perhaps bracing for an 
approaching crisis, even before the on-set of the crisis period.  Notably, in March 2008 
key policy makers were still confident of the strength of the financial system and the 
resilience of the capital markets
3
 – equity market participants obviously felt otherwise 
and started to behave as if a crisis is impending.  During the crisis period WEMSI 
declined steadily and attains its lowest value in October 2008, a month after the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy, at which time the risk appetite of the market participants is 
understandably the lowest.  The WEMSI ventures in to the positive region, buoyed by 
transitory the optimism that the Troubled Asset Relief Program brought to the capital 
markets, but dips again in to the negative zone once the initial confidence of the market 
participants wanes.  In Figure 5, we fit a polynomial trend on the WEMSI, which 
strengthens our arguments as it clearly indicates that market sentiment had followed a U-
shaped trajectory, with the decline beginning many months before the crisis period, 
                                                 
3
 See Figure 5 for a timeline of Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson’s comments during the sample period. 
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which reaches its lowest point right around the bankruptcy which set the financial 
markets in turmoil. 
 
III. Conclusion 
When questioned as to why a collapse of the financial system in 2008 was not 
anticipated those in government and in the financial services industry have claimed that 
there were not any signs that could have served as a warning – the so called “no one saw 
it coming” defense.  In this study we provide strong evidence to show that world equity 
market participants, as indicated by their activity in global markets, did see the crisis 
coming.  We develop an index that measures investor sentiment, which we argue that it 
declines during crisis.  We find that this index drops between February and March 2008 - 
six months before the collapse of Lehman Brothers.  Market participants were beginning 
to behave as is a crisis was around the corner which should have provided policy makers 
around the world ample time to recognize and address growing concerns. A strong 
implication of our findings is that market sentiment indices, including the one developed 
in this paper may provide policy makers with a much needed empirical tool to foretell 
future financial crisis. 
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Table 1: World Market Index Returns 
Pre-Crisis Period 
Date TOPIX ^HSI ^GSPC 000010.SS ^GDAXI ^FTSE ^BVSP ^BSESN ^FCHI 
Dec-07 -2.90% 4.12% 0.22% 4.77% 1.26% 0.34% 3.48% 5.70% -0.46% 
Jan-08 -3.22% 0.29% -1.26% -2.22% -1.90% -1.27% 1.93% 3.40% -2.81% 
Feb-08 -3.52% -1.59% -2.68% -3.08% -2.79% -1.77% 1.14% 0.74% -3.32% 
Mar-08 -4.64% -5.91% -3.09% -7.48% -3.82% -3.18% -1.25% -4.41% -4.13% 
Apr-08 -5.52% -1.64% -1.26% -3.01% -2.18% -0.96% 1.72% -1.83% -2.29% 
May-08 -2.38% -2.01% -0.87% -7.14% -2.26% -1.15% 2.83% -3.79% -2.02% 
Average Return -3.70% -1.12% -1.49% -3.03% -1.95% -1.33% 1.64% -0.03% -2.51% 
Standard Deviation 1.17% 3.28% 1.21% 4.43% 1.71% 1.15% 1.64% 4.04% 1.25% 
Skewness -0.75 0.31 -0.09 1.09 1.54 -0.32 -1.12 0.39 0.58 
          
Crisis Period 2008 
        
          Date TOPIX ^HSI ^GSPC 000010.SS ^GDAXI ^FTSE ^BVSP ^BSESN ^FCHI 
Jun-08 0.37% -0.86% -1.37% -8.65% -1.15% -0.78% 2.12% -4.79% -1.68% 
Jul-08 -0.04% -1.04% -0.87% -8.69% -0.66% -1.55% -0.92% -3.38% -1.55% 
Aug-08 0.22% -1.11% -0.51% -7.59% -0.21% -0.10% -1.41% -0.89% -0.79% 
Sep-08 0.20% -6.71% -3.27% -10.26% -3.31% -4.06% -5.88% -5.33% -4.03% 
Oct-08 -3.78% -10.25% -6.88% -13.73% -6.63% -6.09% -12.23% -9.10% -6.81% 
Nov-08 -8.42% -8.38% -6.65% -7.55% -6.00% -5.09% -10.50% -6.92% -5.78% 
Dec-08 -8.77% -8.24% -6.30% -7.69% -5.58% -3.64% -8.28% -7.03% -5.86% 
Average Return -2.89% -5.23% -3.69% -9.16% -3.36% -3.04% -5.30% -5.35% -3.79% 
Standard Deviation 4.16% 4.08% 2.87% 2.23% 2.73% 2.27% 5.38% 2.69% 2.44% 
Skewness -0.83 0.13 -0.08 -1.79 -0.02 0.05 0.08 0.42 0.05 
          
Post Crisis Period 
       
          Date TOPIX ^HSI ^GSPC 000010.SS ^GDAXI ^FTSE ^BVSP ^BSESN ^FCHI 
Jan-09 -6.89% -8.48% -8.26% -2.50% -7.37% -5.76% -6.07% -7.78% -7.79% 
Feb-09 -8.46% -6.13% -8.64% -0.24% -7.81% -4.69% -4.43% -6.57% -7.61% 
Mar-09 -7.47% -0.45% -3.54% 8.45% -3.66% -2.05% 1.97% 0.04% -4.13% 
Apr-09 -2.40% 2.53% -0.17% 7.68% 0.97% -0.02% 5.43% 4.96% -0.33% 
May-09 0.77% 5.23% 0.74% 8.73% 1.08% 0.12% 7.41% 9.39% 0.69% 
Jun-09 1.15% 7.56% 2.97% 7.02% 2.51% 1.80% 6.96% 10.14% 2.83% 
Average Return -3.88% 0.04% -2.82% 4.85% -2.38% -1.77% 1.88% 1.70% -2.72% 
Standard Deviation 4.29% 6.34% 4.84% 4.91% 4.54% 2.96% 5.86% 7.77% 4.47% 
Skewness 0.23579 -0.32551 -0.26912 -0.99567 -0.28931 -0.35975 -0.6058 -0.20998 -0.08413 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrices 
 
Pre-Crisis Period                   
  TOPIX ^HSI ^GSPC 000010.SS ^GDAXI ^FTSE ^BVSP ^BSESN ^FCHI 
TOPIX 1                 
Hang Seng 0.471 1               
S&P 500 0.444 0.846 1             
SSE 180 0.204 0.923 0.675 1           
DAX 0.420 0.950 0.889 0.915 1         
FTSE 100 0.386 0.935 0.940 0.812 0.923 1       
BOVESPA 0.589 0.856 0.920 0.620 0.807 0.944 1     
SENSEX 0.370 0.902 0.567 0.919 0.800 0.700 0.578 1   
CAC 40 0.425 0.873 0.964 0.756 0.939 0.964 0.909 0.591 1 
  
        
  
Crisis Period 
        
  
  TOPIX ^HSI ^GSPC 000010.SS ^GDAXI ^FTSE ^BVSP ^BSESN ^FCHI 
TOPIX 1                 
Hang Seng 0.726 1               
S&P 500 0.857 0.963 1             
SSE 180 -0.161 0.472 0.340 1           
DAX 0.813 0.977 0.997 0.404 1         
FTSE 100 0.621 0.960 0.915 0.573 0.941 1       
BOVESPA 0.740 0.970 0.939 0.439 0.947 0.941 1     
SENSEX 0.645 0.878 0.908 0.565 0.925 0.900 0.798 1   
CAC 40 0.782 0.984 0.988 0.448 0.996 0.952 0.946 0.934 1 
  
        
  
Post Crisis Period 
        
  
  TOPIX ^HSI ^GSPC 000010.SS ^GDAXI ^FTSE ^BVSP ^BSESN ^FCHI 
TOPIX 1                 
Hang Seng 0.893 1               
S&P 500 0.917 0.986 1             
SSE 180 0.623 0.873 0.848 1           
DAX 0.925 0.971 0.993 0.836 1         
FTSE 100 0.877 0.993 0.989 0.869 0.981 1       
BOVESPA 0.867 0.982 0.975 0.926 0.974 0.977 1     
SENSEX 0.932 0.992 0.987 0.855 0.981 0.980 0.984 1   
CAC 40 0.940 0.986 0.996 0.812 0.992 0.987 0.966 0.989 1 
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Table 3: World Equity Market Sentiment Index Values 
 
Pre-Crisis 







Pre-Crisis Mean 0.028 
 
Crisis Period 
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Figure 6: World Equity Market Sentiment Index Polynomial Trend 
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